gnosis@kim:~#

gnosis@kim:~ # less about_me/stories.md

# Project Stories

Background and results from projects in vulnerability analysis, exploit development, and security research automation.

#cd ../about_me

## 01 Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 - Philips Hue Bridge Pro

#open zdi results

### Background

  • Pwn2Own is a hacking competition hosted by the Zero Day Initiative, where competitors must exploit real, retail consumer devices on-site to prove exploitability.
  • The Smart Home target, the Philips Hue Bridge Pro, is a hub that controls home lighting and connected devices, and a compromise of it can become a pivot point to other devices on the home network.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Successfully demonstrated the Philips Hue Bridge Pro exploit and recorded a Win at Pwn2Own Ireland 2026.
  • Awarded $12,000 and 2.5 Master of Pwn points.

### Lessons Learned

  • Experienced that with hardware and embedded systems you cannot simply attach a debugger as with software; because of hardware mitigations, building a debugging environment that makes the device observable is itself a research effort that demands dedicated focus.
  • Gained experience carrying vulnerability analysis through to a reproducible, working exploit under the constraint of attacking a retail consumer device on-site within a fixed time window, rather than in a lab setting.
  • In chaining multiple vulnerabilities into a single attack path, confirmed that reliably stitching them together, rather than any single flaw, is the core of a real exploit.

## 02 IoT Smart Doorbell Vulnerability Analysis

#open analysis guide

### Background

  • Despite the rapid proliferation of IoT devices, products with insufficient security verification were being distributed in the market.
  • Smart doorbells are devices directly related to home security, and vulnerabilities could lead to privacy invasion and physical security threats.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Discovered 18 CVEs, demonstrating the severity of IoT device security vulnerabilities.
  • Contributed to the IoT security research community by open-sourcing the analysis guide.

### Lessons Learned

  • Realized that IoT device security requires not only software but hardware-level analysis, and a comprehensive approach covering both sides is essential.
  • Experienced that systematic vulnerability reporting processes (CVE registration) and publishing research results can contribute to the entire security ecosystem.

## 03 Agentic AI-based ExploitAgent Research

### Background

  • Traditional vulnerability analysis was a manual, expert-dependent process that struggled to keep pace with increasing software complexity.
  • Advances in Agentic AI opened possibilities for implementing autonomous security analysis agents.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Academic value recognized through Best Paper Award at KSII Autumn Conference.
  • Evolved into the SCOUT project, initiating development of an automation system targeting real IoT firmware.

### Lessons Learned

  • Learned that applying AI to security requires ensuring trustworthiness of agent decision-making processes beyond simple automation.
  • Realized that organizing and presenting research as academic papers plays an important role in improving research quality and receiving community feedback.

## 04 MuCamp2 - Validated Cyber Campaign Variant Generation

#open paper#open code

### Background

  • APT group attribution and CTI analysis face limited real campaign data, so augmenting TTP sequences required validation that preserves tactic structure and operational plausibility.
  • Using LLMs as free-form generators can produce plausible but unverified campaign variants, requiring a design that combines constrained candidate pools with independent validation.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • The MuCamp2 paper was published in IEEE Access 2026, with paper and code artifacts released through IEEE Xplore and GitHub.
  • Reported a 0% tactic violation rate and L3 pass-rate improvements of +5.5 pp for Lazarus and +3.0 pp for MenuPass.
  • Established a security research pattern where the LLM is a constrained selection/refinement module rather than a trusted actor, and outputs are gated by independent validators.

### Lessons Learned

  • Confirmed that security data augmentation is less about generation volume and more about publishing structural integrity, validation criteria, and coverage limits together.
  • Learned that LLM-based security automation is not justified by model capability alone; trust boundaries, constraints, and reproducible evaluation pipelines must be designed together.

## 05 SCOUT - AEG-First Firmware-to-Exploit Evidence Engine

#open github

### Background

  • IoT firmware vulnerability analysis often separates filesystem, ELF binaries, shell scripts, SBOM, CVE matching, and dynamic validation results, making it difficult to build reproducible evidence chains that analysts can immediately follow.
  • To apply Agentic AI-based AEG at real firmware scale, a deterministic evidence structure anchored by hashes, offsets, file paths, and stage artifacts was required before relying on LLM reasoning.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Achieved a 98.8% success rate (1110/1123) when validating against 1,123 firmware images from the FirmAE dataset.
  • Extended SCOUT into the v3.0.0-rc1 Hybrid Analysis Engine pre-release and recorded 99.3% LLM Tribunal-based false-positive reduction.
  • Processed 1,334 shell scripts in TP-Link ER605 validation and manually reviewed the top 20 script findings, reducing the blind spots of a binary-only scanner.
  • Recorded vulnerable-gate-pass and patched/control dynamic fail-closed evidence on a real Netgear R7000 CVE-2017-5521 known-vulnerable/patched pair.
  • Stabilized the large-scale firmware analysis pipeline into a regression-testable state through 1,136+ tests, release gates, and documentation consistency checks.
  • Executed most of the project's core work end-to-end, including architecture design, core development, debugging, benchmarking, testing, documentation, and presentation.

### Lessons Learned

  • Learned that security automation is not about models producing plausible answers, but about making every judgment traceable back to original bytes and reproducible evidence.
  • Experienced that applying Agentic AI to real vulnerability analysis requires designing automation, validation, reporting, and team operations as one integrated system.

## 06 AutoHack 2025 Automotive Hacking Competition

### Background

  • The importance of automotive cybersecurity has rapidly increased with advances in connected cars and autonomous driving technology.
  • AutoHack 2025 was a hacking and defense competition targeting real vehicle systems, providing an opportunity to validate practical capabilities.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Received the COSS Council Chair Award, recognizing capabilities in automotive security.

### Lessons Learned

  • Experienced that automotive security has unique protocols and constraints different from IT security, and domain-specific knowledge is essential.
  • Learned the importance of role division and real-time communication in team-based CTF/hacking competitions.

## 07 Terminator - Autonomous Security Agent System

#open github

### Background

  • CTF solving and bug bounty hunting repeat a cycle of analysis, exploit writing, and validation, so I wanted to see whether that human workflow could be moved onto autonomous agents.
  • However, LLM-based agents tend to report non-working results plausibly, so a structure that enforces verification first was required.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Blocked reporting of non-working results through a verification-first methodology (3x local validation before execution, critic-agent veto) and a no-exploit-no-report policy.
  • Achieved autonomous solving of 30+ CTF challenges and submission of 40+ bug bounty reports.

### Lessons Learned

  • Confirmed that the real value of autonomous security agents lies less in generation capability and more in the gate that filters out results not backed by a working PoC.

## 08 AUTOGLITCH - Autonomous Fault Injection Framework

#open github

### Background

  • Fault injection (glitching) against embedded hardware has a vast combination of parameters such as voltage and timing, so manually searching for successful conditions required extensive trial and error.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Passed 127 tests and all quality gates (ruff, mypy, pytest), with hardware validation on real embedded devices (STM32F3, etc.) planned as follow-up research.

### Lessons Learned

  • Learned that hardware security experiments need a repeatable mock path designed alongside the automation, so that research can continue even when access to real equipment is limited.

## 09 Awesome Offensive MCP

#open github

### Background

  • As Agentic AI tooling grew quickly, MCP servers usable in offensive security workflows were scattered, and it was hard to judge which tools were actually usable.

### Role

### Results & Impact

  • Reached 18 GitHub stars and was shared as an MCP reference in the offensive security community.

### Lessons Learned

  • Confirmed that the value of a tool list lies not in the volume collected but in making the verification criteria explicit.